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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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limitations that they must honestly follow, in harmony with their Allies
a policy friendly to Russia." But what would happen when the Allied
policy of being c friendly J towards Russia or perhaps conversely when
the Russian policy of being friendly to the Allies no longer suired the
designs of one party or the other ? Until now., loyalty to commitments
had been the recognised language of international relations., but Chuchill's
statement on fi friendship ' made at the order of the stronger Power
was a novurn in the language of British statesmen. In fact this argument
was to become so general that shortly afterwards Professor Haldane3
a member of the British Communist Party, earnestly wrote in London's
Daily Worker that Britain must also be friendly to the Soviet Union
since they would be able to bomb London from the Mainland while
the British could not reach Soviet industry behind the Urals.
The e friendliness ' demanded by Russia from her weaker neighbours
was not merely a matter of sentiment or promises extended and given,
it was rather a question of evidence—in other words, the neighbours
must give the Kremlin proof by removing all parties and groups suspected
of being anti-Soviet, replacing them by Communists or if there were
none3 by persons chosen by Moscow. Only a government comprised
of such individuals could adopt a e friendly ' attitude towards the Soviet
Union. It was obvious that the British Prime Minister's ideas on c friend-
liness ' in the international arena and the Soviet interpretation of it,
were as far from each other as the North and South Poles.
The sentence in Churchill's speech to the effect that£C Poland in harmony
with their Allies . . . must follow a policy friendly to Russia " proved
to be far from satisfactory hearing to the Kremlin, it was distinctly
anti- Soviet in flavour and tended towards establishing Poland in the
Allied camp—the very situation which the Kremlin aimed at preventing.
An authoritative guide as to what road Poland should follow, was given
by Stalin himself on May n, 1945—the Polish Government should
" carry out a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and not a policy
of a cordon sanitaire directed against the Soviet Union."
In Churchill's attempts to both prove the e moderate' desires of
Stalin, and to defend himself he contrasted the Soviet demands for the
* Curzon Line' with that western frontier established under Tsarist
Russia, whose territories had been swollen to the extent of several thousand
square miles, firstly by the partitioned Polish Commonwealth and then
by the annexation of Congress Poland. Such a comparison seemed
entirely irrelevant when viewed in the light of the fact that the Tsarist
frontier established before the First Great War, owed its existence to
force and the attempted annihilation of Poland. As the situation stood
Stalin was demanding the consent of his two partners to the 'Curzon
Line * pro forma, for he was already holding and annexing Poland and
had expanded even further to the Oder, to Czecho-Slovakia and its
boundary with Bavaria, to the Adriatic, Yugoslavia, and its boundary